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Abstract
This paper presents a model where young and old workers compete for
one type of jobs in the presence of retirement opportunity. Within this
framework, we show that increased retirement opportunities (such as early
retirement) has most of the time a depressing impact on the unemployment
rate. Indeed the number of vacancies posted by ﬁrms is inﬂuenced by the
probability that an old worker is going into retirement. We show that the
degree to which younger workers are inﬂuenced by retirement of older work-
ers depends on the relative productivity of young and older workers. It is
only when older workers are much more productive than young workers that
retirement may beneﬁt to unemployment.
11 Introduction
In the last few decades, many countries have experienced a major shift in the labor
force participation of older workers. The development of social security programs
has had a signiﬁcant impact on labor market behavior. As documented in Gruber
and Wise (1999), many countries have introduced a variety of early retirement
schemes and long-term unemployment insurance programs that allow for older
workers to retire well before the normal retirement age. Consequently, people are
retiring earlier and the labor force participation of older workers is falling.
In public discussions, the idea of retirement as an instrument for reducing
unemployment emerged early on. Most of the programs, inducing early retirement,
have been introduced directly to combat unemployment problems facing younger
workers. The argument is based on the idea of work sharing or the assumption
of a lump of labor. Kapteyn et al. (2004) explained that the idea relies on the
simple notion that, in a given period, a ﬁxed amount of labor input required to
produce a ﬁxed volume of goods and services can be shared between persons who
are already employed and those who are unemployed. It is usually argued that a
trade-oﬀ can be made between the positively valued leisure of the older employed
and the unwanted leisure of the younger unemployed.
Few studies have addressed the validity of such a claim. Boldrin et al. (1999)
looked at the labor force participation rate of older workers and the unemployment
rate of younger cohorts in European countries. Their estimates do not show evi-
dence of a negative correlation between the exit rates from the labor force of older
workers and the variation in the unemployment rates among young workers. There
are several reasons for the failure of such a policy. One simple reason may be that
the central assumption is wrong, i.e. workers are not perfectly substitutable. Sur-
veys of empirical literature on substitution patterns for workers of diﬀerent ages
show no homogeneous evidence. Hammermesh and Grant (1979) and Hammer-
2mesh (1987) provide a critical survey of the large number of studies at hand and
the results are quite heterogeneous. Their conclusion is that the young worker’s
own-wage elasticity of demand exceeds unity, but the degree to which young and
older workers are substitutes for each other is unclear. Hebbink (1993) ﬁnds that
the demand for young and older workers changes in the same direction if one of
their wages changes. Young and older workers are therefore complementary factors
of production.
In this paper, we intend to provide an analysis of age-related eﬀects in the la-
bor market when older workers are aﬀected by retirement programs. We develop a
model of equilibrium unemployment following the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides
model, in which we consider two types of worker, young and older, who are diﬀer-
ent in individual attributes but who compete for the same job. Previous studies
have focused on diﬀerent age-groups in the labor market (see Shimer (2001) and
Hairault et al. (2006) for example), especially on the impact of the aging process
on the labor outcomes of diﬀerent age groups. However, none were concerned with
the impact on younger workers of the retirement behavior of older people. In this
respect, we deviate from previous studies by incorporating productivity diﬀeren-
tials and diﬀerences in age-speciﬁc separation risks due partly to the older workers’
opportunity to retire. We also model the life-cycle behavior of the workers.
Within this framework, we show that a higher propensity to retire has mainly
negative externalities on labor outcomes, especially in the case of younger cohorts.
First, when workers diﬀer with respect to the probability of ending a match with
an employer, with some workers having a higher probability of quitting, ﬁrms will
anticipate this and restore proﬁtability by opening up fewer vacancies in equilib-
rium. Second, when ”high exit” workers are much more productive than the other
workers, this may generate a positive externality. The supply of vacancies will
depend positively on the fraction of more productive workers searching for a job.
3Under certain conditions, this second externality dominates the ﬁrst one. Both
eﬀects are common knowledge in the literature and this has been highlighted by
Ortega (2000) paper on migration regarding foreign workers facing higher search
costs and therefore receiving lower wages and also in Gautier (2002) regarding
low-skilled and high-skilled workers competing for low-skilled jobs. However, in
the context of retirement opportunities, the probability of exit also applies to un-
employed people and thus directly aﬀects the number of older job-seekers. As a
consequence, it reduces the incentive for ﬁrms to open up more vacancies in order
to attract older workers. We show that an increase in levels of retirement has
the eﬀect of increasing the level of younger workers’ unemployment. Even if older
workers are suﬃciently productive to induce the opening up of more vacancies, the
fall in the number of older job-seekers reduces the positive eﬀect. Finally, we iden-
tify a high level of productivity diﬀerential above which an increase in retirement
will beneﬁt all workers. Unfortunately such a level is very unlikely in reality.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we outline the
equilibrium unemployment model with age-related heterogeneity in the labor force
and early retirement possibility. Section 3 presents some simulation results based
on a calibrated version of the model. Section 4 proposes an econometric framework
to assess the impact of early retirement on unemployment. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by a continuum of ﬁrms and workers. Firms produce
a unique ﬁnal good and employ only one worker. Workers may be young or old
(indexed y,o) and the share of young individuals in the population is given by p.
The exogenous probability of becoming old for a young worker is given by ηy and
4older workers go to retirement with probability ηo. Thus workers remain young for
a period equal to 1/ηy and they are old during a period equal to 1/ηo. We assume
that the risk to becoming a retiree is supported during a short duration time so
that ηo > ηy. The aggregate workforce is assumed to be constant and normalized
to 1.
A job can be ﬁlled by either type of worker but the productivity of the job
depends on the type of worker employed. A job occupied by a young worker
produces γ while a job occupied by an older worker produces δγ. At this point,
there is no a priori reason to assume δ to be larger or smaller than 1. In this
respect, we introduce heterogeneity in the labor force in a way similar to Acemoglu
(1997) and Gautier (2002), who distinguished between high-skilled and low-skilled
workers. However when hiring a younger worker the ﬁrm interiorizes that the
worker will become old with a probability ηy.
Workers and vacancies meet according to a CRS matching function which is
increasing in the relevant amount of searchers and vacancies and is concave, M =
M(v,u) with v denoting the number of vacancies and u being the number of young
and old unemployed. Vacancies are equally open to young and older workers but
search frictions limit the matching of unemployed workers and vacancies. Another
modeling strategy would be to allow ﬁrms to aim their vacancies at a speciﬁc
type of worker. In this case we should consider two distinct matching functions
according to the age of the workers. This would not change the following analysis
and our main results would hold except for the trading externalities when both
types of worker are competing for the same jobs.Vacancies are equally open to
young and older workers but search frictions limit the matching of unemployed
workers and vacancies. Another modeling strategy would be to allow ﬁrms to
aim their vacancies at a speciﬁc type of worker. In this case, we would consider
two distinct matching functions according to the age of the workers. This would
5not change the following analysis and our main results would hold except for the
trading externalities when both types of worker are competing for the same jobs.
Diamond (1982) showed that parties on the same side of the market create in
general negative search externalities, while parties on diﬀerent sides of the market
create positive search externalities.
Given the CRS property of the technology and the standard matching assump-






and equivalently the probability of a worker contacting a ﬁrm is represented re-
spectively by m
u = m(θ,1) = θq(θ). The tightness of the labor market is given by
θ = v/u. Under the CRS assumption the probability of ﬁlling a job is the sum









q(θ) = (1 − pπ)q(θ) (2)
Note that, given the properties of the matching technology, qy(θ) and qo(θ) are
decreasing in vacancies and increasing in the number of job-seekers: q
′
y ≤ 0 and
q
′
o ≤ 0, while θqy(θ) and θqo(θ) are increasing in vacancies and decreasing in the
number of job-seekers.
Finally, matches have a constant risk of coming to an end, which is expressed by
a rate of separation that hits young and older worker matches at the probabilities
 y and  o respectively. Whenever a match is destroyed the job becomes vacant
and bears a maintenance cost k, while the worker becomes unemployed1.
1Our framework is very similar to that of Hetze and Ochsen (2006) except for the fact that
those authors do not take into account the transition from one age group to another. In their
study, the authors also extend a standard model of equilibrium unemployment by the distinction
between age speciﬁc separation risks and a productivity diﬀerential between young and older
workers but they are only concerned with the modiﬁcation of relative group sizes due to the
aging process.
6Figure 1 summarizes these labor ﬂows and transition probabilities where ey
and eo stand for a young or an older employed worker respectively.
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2.2 Agents payoﬀs
Workers and ﬁrms are risk neutral and discount the future at rate r. Firms post
vacancies that are ﬁlled with the endogenous probability q(θ). We also assume
that ﬁrms cannot discriminate exante between young and older workers, due to
existing legislation. The asset value for an unﬁlled vacancy (Jv) is then:
rJv = −k + q(θ)(J − Jv) (3)
where J is the value of a ﬁlled job.
However once a ﬁrm meets a worker, it can observe his or her age. Then the
value of a ﬁlled job is diﬀerent for a young (Jy) or an older worker (Jo)2:
rJy = γ − wy +  y(Jv − Jy) + ηy(Jo − Jy) (4)
rJo = δγ − wo + ( o + ηo)(Jv − Jo) (5)
where wy and wo denote the wage for young and older workers respectively. The
2Without lack of generality, the selling price of the output is assumed to be 1.
7expression for the value of a ﬁlled job is given by:
J ≡ pπJy + (1 − pπ)Jo (6)
The expected income stream of a vacancy is equal to the probability that the
vacancy meets a particular worker times the expected rents of a match with this
worker. Given qy(θ) and qo(θ), this depends not only on the stock of unemployed
workers but also on the composition of unemployment. Furthermore, when the
worker ﬁlling the vacancy is young, the ﬁrm knows that the worker will become
old with probability ηy. Similarly, when the worker is older, the asset value of the
ﬁlled vacancy takes into account the fact that the worker will go onto retirement
with probability ηo.
Workers are heterogeneous with respect to their productivity and their rate of
separation. The employment of a younger or an older worker provides diﬀerent
returns to the ﬁrms and consequently a job provides a diﬀerent income for the two
groups of workers. We assume that the value of an agent being retired, Wr, is 0
and the values of being employed (Wi) and unemployed (Ui) are given by:
rWy = wy +  y(Uy − Wy) + ηy(Wo − Wy) (7)
rWo = wo +  o(Uo − Wo) + ηo(Wr − Wo) (8)
rUy = b + θq(θ)(Wy − Uy) + ηy(Uo − Uy) (9)
rUo = b + θq(θ)(Wo − Uo) + ηo(Wr − Uo) (10)
where b is the return during job search. Typically, b is composed of unemployment
beneﬁts. Firms are assumed to post vacancies until all the rents from new job are




γ − wy + ηy
δγ−wo
r+ o+ηo
r +  y + ηy
+ (1 − pπ)
δγ − wo
r +  o + ηo
(11)
This relationship gives the job creation curve (JC) and gives the combined
labor demand of both types of worker by the ﬁrm. This condition states that in
equilibrium, the expected income from a ﬁlled vacancy must equal the total cost
of posting it.
2.3 Wage setting
Our analysis considers the opportunity for older workers to go onto retirement.
Such an opportunity raises questions about wage formation. In the literature, it
is common practice to let wages be determined by an axiomatic Nash bargaining
solution. However, studies regarding ”on-the-job-search” showed that workers may
use outside opportunities to obtain a higher wage in the same job (Burdett and
Mortensen, 1998). Recently, Cahuc et al. (2006) considered a model in which
employers are allowed to match the oﬀer of a rival employer and showed that
workers can exploit the outside oﬀers to obtain a pay rise.
In our context, this argument suggests that older workers use the threat of
retiring as a bargaining tool to obtain higher wages. We decided not to follow this
route because it is very unlikely that workers renegotiate wages on the basis of
retirement opportunities. The vast literature on retirement decision-making has
shown that the generosity of social security beneﬁts and positively valued leisure
make continued work unattractive (Gruber and Wise, 1999). Among other factors,
the lowering of the standard retirement age has contributed to the increase in the
so-called ”implicit tax” on work. This is what we want to analyze through the
impact of ηo.
9Wages are the outcome of bilateral Nash bargaining between ﬁrms and workers.





where β gives the bargaining power of workers. The wages solving this problem
are (see appendix):
wy =


























It is important to note that the wages of older and younger workers will diverge
according to several factors. Except for extreme values of β, there is a twofold
eﬀect of the probability of ﬁnding a job. On the one hand, the wage increases
with θq(θ) because, if it is easier to ﬁnd another job, workers accommodate easily
to being rejected in the job market and require better wages. On the other hand,
the wage decreases with θq(θ) because ﬁrms have to wait for a longer period to ﬁll
a vacancy and this reduces the total revenue to be shared from the match. But
wages diﬀer with age because productivity and separation rates diﬀer with age.
Equation (13) also shows that the wage of the young workers will be inﬂuenced by
their probability of staying with a ﬁrm and going into the older workers’ group.
If they have a positive probability of aging (ηy > 0), they capture a part of the
outcome when old, Jo. This additional term obviously depends on their bargaining
power.
102.4 Supply of vacancies
We will now derive the relationship between the supply of vacancies by ﬁrms and
the key parameters of our framework. Consider a standard matching function:
m = vǫu1−ǫ. Since ﬁrms post vacancies up to the point where the expected value
of a ﬁlled job is equal to the total cost of ﬁlling it, i.e. J = k/q(θ), we easily obtain









The supply of vacancies depends on the composition of unemployment. Even
if at the moment they open up a vacancy, employers do not know whether they
will meet a young or an older worker, they do know the aggregate composition of
unemployment, and therefore they can anticipate the probability of meeting each
of the worker types. There is no direct analytical solution for θ but it appears that
δ plays a crucial role.
Employers may prefer to hire a young or an older worker because the age group
has a higher productivity-wage ratio or a lower separation rate. However, ﬁrms
also know that if they reject the candidature of a worker, it causes further search
costs. Firms have to pay k for an additional 1/q(θ) period. Therefore, ﬁrms accept
applicants, whatever the age group, if the cost of rejection is equal to the gain of
employing a better worker. In other words, the age-speciﬁc diﬀerences have no
eﬀect on the value of a job if the free entry condition holds. The value of δ for
which this holds, δ∗, is derived from:
δ
∗ = 1 +
( o −  y + ηo)(1 − b
γ)
r +  y + βθq(θ)
(16)
The productivity level for a job occupied by an older worker being as proﬁtable
11as a job occupied by a young worker is directly aﬀected by the expected duration of
the job. If the exogenous rates of termination of older workers ( o, ηo) increase, the
required level of productivity increases. In particular, the higher the probability of
retirement for an older worker (ηo increases), the higher the level of productivity
must be to compensate employers for the shorter expected match duration.
When δ < δ∗, it is more gainful to employ a younger than an older worker
because an older worker does not produce enough to compensate for their higher
probability of quitting (ηo > ηy). By contrast, if older workers produce suﬃciently
more than younger workers, ﬁrms may prefer hiring older workers. Therefore,
competition between both types of worker induces a standard negative congestion
externality, but older workers also create a positive search externality on young
workers. This positive externality is similar to that discussed by Gautier (2002)
and by Ortega (2000) when considering the productivity diﬀerential of skilled and
unskilled workers or search costs diﬀerential for native and immigrant workers.
This result stems from the fact that the more highly productive older workers
search for a job, the more attractive it is for employers to open up vacancies. Young
workers may beneﬁt from the increase in θ, which makes the probability of ﬁnding
a job higher. The negative trading externality arises because young and older
workers are punished exactly the same for the fact that older workers have a higher
probability of quitting, ηo. But when δ > δ∗, the ratio of vacancies to workers
increases in the number of old job-seekers, uo. In this case, the young workers
beneﬁt from the larger supply of vacancies caused by the higher productivity of
older workers.
At this point nothing is new, in the present study, in comparison with previous
studies. However, when ηo increases, not only does it increase the level of δ∗
required to make a job occupied by an older worker as proﬁtable as a job occupied
by a young worker but it reduces directly the number of older job-seekers. Indeed,
12older unemployed workers are concerned with the probability of retirement in a
similar way to older employed workers. This, in turn, also has an impact on θ,
which modiﬁes the probability of ﬁnding a job for all workers. We then obtain a
third externality caused by ηo not yet identiﬁed.
When older workers go into retirement they aﬀect not only their own labor
outcomes but also the whole of the labor market equilibrium. The eﬀect on equi-
librium unemployment as well as on the levels of unemployment of younger workers
will depend on the value taken by δ. From (15), it can be shown that, except for
values of δ higher than δ∗∗, dθ/duo > 0 3. Therefore a value δ∗∗ exists for which
dθ/duo = 0 and is negative for any value of δ > δ∗∗. From this, we can determine








= (ǫ − 1)θ
ǫ dθ
duo
> 0,ifδ < δ
∗∗
When δ < δ∗∗,the probability of retirement, which decreases the number of
older unemployed, reduces the market tightness and consequently the probability
of ﬁnding a job for every worker. Since v is an increasing function of uo, when uo
decreases because of higher ηo, ﬁrms open fewer vacancies. Moreover if δ < δ∗,
ﬁrms know that older workers are poorly productive. When ﬁrms meet an older
worker, if they reject the match, they will have to wait for a further period of
time before making another match. This increases the cost of the vacancy, which
induces them to open up even fewer vacancies. It is only in the case where δ > δ∗∗
that increased retirement is proﬁtable for both young and older workers.
It is important to note that even though we had assumed that ﬁrms open
up vacancies to speciﬁc age groups, the eﬀect of increased retirement would still
depend on the productivity diﬀerential. This is because when hiring a young
3It can be shown that the sign of dθ/duo depends on the value taken by δ. The simulations
of next section will clarify this.
13worker, ﬁrms know that the match will turn into an older match at some point
and, as a result, they interiorize the fact that productivity will change.
2.5 Equilibrium unemployment
The model can be closed by writing down the ﬂow conditions in the steady state:
ηyuy + θq(θ)uy =  y(1 − uy) + ηbuy (17)
ηouo + θq(θ)uo =  o(1 − uo) + ηyuy (18)
where ηb stands for the proportion of young unemployed workers entering the labor
market. This corresponds to young people ﬁnishing school and entering the labor
market as job-seekers. In the steady state, the population growth is zero and
there is no aging process of the population. This is a convenient assumption to
get rid of any additive eﬀect coming from a change in the size of the cohort4. The
equilibrium age-speciﬁc rates of unemployment are therefore given by:
uy =
 y
 y + θq(θ) + ηy − ηb
(19)
uo =
 o + ηyuy
 o + θq(θ) + ηo
(20)
It is easy to see that, in steady state equilibrium, the unemployment rate for
young workers is higher than the unemployment rate for older workers. In the likely
case that jobs occupied by young workers are destroyed sooner and according to
the unique matching function, the rate at which both types of worker ﬁnd vacancies
is exactly the same, but older workers have a higher probability of quitting their
age-speciﬁc labor pool (ηo > ηy).
4See Shimer (2001) or also Hetze and Ochsen (2006) for an analysis of the eﬀect of a change
in the youth cohort’s size on the equilibrium unemployment.
14The Beveridge curve (BC) is obtained by summing the two unemployment rates
weighted at the respective population shares:
u = puy + (1 − p)uo (21)
3 An illustrative simulation
We will carry out some simulations to illustrate the properties of the model and
to gain insights into the eﬀect of increased retirement. We divide the population
into two age groups corresponding to workers aged 15-54 and workers aged 55-64.
This corresponds to the age at which workers may be entitled to retirement op-
portunities in most OECD countries. Our baseline corresponds to the equilibrium
corresponding to the case where there is no productivity diﬀerence between work-
ers. Starting from this point, we introduce successively a productivity diﬀerential
and a positive increase in the probability of retirement to illustrate the eﬀect on
equilibrium unemployment.
3.1 Parameter values
The matching function takes the usual Cobb-Douglas form with constant returns
to scale. The Cobb-Douglas matching function with constant returns to scale ﬁts
well evidence on labor market ﬂows (Blanchard and Diamond, 1989). Unemploy-
ment and vacancies are assumed to have equal weights in the matching function
(Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). The exogenous variables of the model are set
at the following values:
β = 0.5; ǫ = 0.5; b = 0.3γ; r = 0.05;
 y = 0.15;  o = 0.1; γ = 1; δ = 1 .
The interest rate is set to 5%. The labor productivity of young workers is,
15without loss of generality, normalized to 1 and in the baseline case there is no
diﬀerence in productivity between workers (δ = 1). We set age-speciﬁc destruction
rates at  y = 0.15 and  o = 0.10. This to refer to the higher cost of ﬁring an
older workers than a young workers 5. The beneﬁt replacement rate is set to 30%
of the productivity level, which is in accordance with the estimations made by
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). The cost of a vacancy is chosen arbitrarily so that
the unemployment rates for young and older workers are in the same order of
magnitude as in OECD countries.
3.2 Simulations
Table 1 presents the results of the simulations. The baseline values correspond to
equilibrium before an increase of ηo. The table shows that the young unemploy-
ment rate is 8.5% and the older unemployment rate is 5.3%. Those values are of
the same order of magnitude as the unemployment rates of the OECD countries.
The total unemployment rate is 8.1%. The critical value of δ∗ is 1.04, which means
that when older workers produce more than 1.04 times as much as young workers
in their jobs, employers actually prefer older workers in those jobs. Consequently
the employers open up more vacancies if the ratio of older unemployed workers to
young unemployed workers increases.
Whether or not the output of older workers changes, young workers may beneﬁt
from older workers looking for a job. When the productivity diﬀerential is in
favor of young workers, everything else being equal, the young unemployment rate
increases by 0.07 of a percentage point, whereas when older workers are highly
productive, the young unemployment rate decreases compared to our baseline
case. This conﬁrms the role played by δ∗ as a pivotal.
5See for example the French ”Delalande act” which imposes higher severance pay for separa-
tion of old workers.
16Table 1: Eﬀects of increased retirement: numerical simulations
Urate
y Urate
o Urate δ∗ δ∗∗
Before increased retirement
δ = 1(Baseline) 8.45 5.26 8.13 1.04 -
δ = 0.8 8.52 5.29 8.19 1.04 -
δ = 1.2 8.39 5.20 8.07 1.04 -
δ = 2.3 8.04 4.98 7.74 1.04 -
After increased retirement
δ = 1 9.03 5.00 8.62 1.10 2.20
δ = 0.8 9.09 5.03 8.68 1.11 2.20
δ = 1.2 8.96 4.97 8.52 1.10 2.20
δ = 2.3 7.65 4.52 7.34 1.09 2.20
We then simulate the impact of an increase in the probability of retirement
of 10 percentage points by diﬀerentiating again the level of productivity of older
workers. In this respect, we pay attention to the extreme value of δ, which makes
the ratio of vacancies to job-seekers independent of the increase in ηo.
When δ= 1, the introduction of early retirement possibilities for older workers
increases the unemployment rate of young workers. As stressed previously, an
increase in the probability of exit for older workers has a negative impact on labor
outcomes. It reduces the value of a ﬁlled job for ﬁrms, which consequently reduces
their supply of vacancies. There are two eﬀects. First, because a job match has
a lower duration, its expected value is decreased. Second, given the fact that
older workers are going onto retirement earlier and more often than before, the
number of unemployed workers decreases, thereby reducing the number of possible
applicants for a vacancy. This reduces the probability of a ﬁrm ﬁlling a vacancy.
When δ= 0.8, the productivity of older workers is less than that of young
workers, the eﬀect is much higher because it is not proﬁtable for ﬁrms to ﬁll a
job with older workers. Since there is a positive probability of meeting an older
17worker, this lengthens the time of a good match. It increases the cost of vacancies.
When δ= 1.2, the productivity of older workers is suﬃciently high (δ = 1.2 >
δ∗). Young workers are penalized to a lesser extent than in the two previous cases.
Since older workers compensate for their higher probability of quitting, ﬁrms have
an incentive to open up vacancies in order to obtain a match with older workers.
Young workers beneﬁt from this. However, at this level, productivity is not high
enough (δ < δ∗∗) to also compensate for the drop in old unemployment. Everything
else being equal, the young unemployment rate drops by 0.13 of a percentage point
to 8.96% in comparison with the situation where productivity is identical for both
types of worker but it increases in comparison with the situation before increased
retirement possibilities.
Finally, when δ= 2.3, the productivity of older workers is high enough to
induce ﬁrms to open up even more vacancies and this reduces both young and
older unemployment levels. This means that the productivity of older workers has
to be more than 2.2 times higher than the productivity of younger workers in order
for retirement to be beneﬁcial to young and global unemployment. This result has
to be mitigated. There are few reasons to expect such a productivity diﬀerential.
In the empirical literature, diﬀerent approaches have been used to estimate the age-
productivity relationship and although they are somewhat contradictory in terms
of estimated proﬁles of productivity, they have never found such a productivity
diﬀerential6.
Interestingly, we see that in every case, the unemployment of the older work-
ers decreased as a consequence of early retirement. This is not surprising since
early retirement directly aﬀects the pool of unemployed workers. However, the
magnitudes are diﬀerent and this is also related to the situation of young workers.
Indeed, since unemployment of older worker is directly related to that of younger
6A good survey of the literature on age and individual productivity can be found in Skirbekk
(2003).
18workers, the beneﬁts of increased retirement will be diminished by the eﬀects on
the young. When the situation is really bad for young workers, the unemployment
rate of older workers is also badly aﬀected.
4 Empirical evidence
We will now compare our theoretical predictions with empirical facts. The model
predicts diﬀerent eﬀects of retirement on unemployment according to the assump-
tions made on the heterogeneity of workers.
The strategy is to link the theoretical model with an econometric model through
the estimation of a reduced-form speciﬁcation of the unemployment rates. We use
OECD data from Bassanini and Duval (2006). This database has been widely used
to estimate reduced-form unemployment equations and is consistent for analysis
of theoretical models of labor market equilibrium. We retain 12 countries7 and
estimate unemployment as a panel model. The period goes from 1982 to 2003.
Since institutions typically have low variation and are highly correlated within a
country8 we introduce ﬁxed country eﬀects and a time trend is also included. The
equations to be estimated are of the form:
log(uit) = βo + β2log(vit) + β2bit + β3udit + β4epit
+β5γit + β6lcit + β7rrit + β8TFPit + β9pit
+β10erit + β11trendt + φi + ǫit (22)
This equation is very close to the Beveridge curve of theoretical models. The
share of the young workers population (p) is given by the observed share of workers
7Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom and United States.
8see Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005).
19aged between 15 and 54 years old in the total active population. The separation
rates are made up of a common idiosyncratic shock, which will be approximated
by two variables as well as an age-speciﬁc hazard rate. First, the total factor
productivity shock (TFP) should induce a temporary decline in unemployment.
Second, the real interest rate shock (rr) aﬀects negatively capital accumulation
and labor productivity, thereby reducing labor demand. We assume that the age-
speciﬁc separation probability is taken into account through p. We proxy γ not
only by the real labor productivity but also by labor costs in real productivity
units (lc). We consider the bargaining power of workers approximated by union
density (ud).
The matching eﬃciency, which is taken as exogenous in the theoretical model,
is a function of the beneﬁt replacement rate (b) and employment protection (ep)
in the econometric model. A change in the replacement rate aﬀects the search
behavior of job-seekers in two ways. First, a higher replacement rate makes the
search less costly and extends the search for a better match. Consequently, the
resulting higher match quality decreases the consequent quit rate. This outweighs
the increased search duration and therefore the matching eﬃciency increases. Sec-
ond, the search duration can outweigh the quit rate and, as a result, the matching
eﬃciency decreases. Similarly, employment protection may aﬀect the search be-
havior of ﬁrms in two ways. First, since the cost of dismissal increases, ﬁrms intend
to reduce dismissals and select job candidates cautiously. The matching eﬃciency
increases if the eﬀect of the resulting lower separation rate exceeds the eﬀect of an
extended duration of search. The vacancy rate and the replacement rate are di-
rectly observable. Our variables are also important in accounting for institutional
eﬀects on job destruction such as union density and employment protection, which
reduce the ﬂexibility of ﬁrms to react to changes in the economic environment.
Thus p controls for unobserved heterogeneity resulting from a change in the
20age composition but also for other sources of heterogeneity between age groups.
However, p does not have to capture eﬀects from a change in the participation
of older workers, for a given age structure; this has to be the result of the early
retirement opportunity. This is taken into account through an indicator of the
replacement rate of early retirement schemes (er). This variable was calculated by
Duval (2004) for a number of OECD countries. It has the advantage of avoiding
some of the endogeneity problems related to the use of labor force participation or
the employment rates of older workers. If the replacement rate of social security
beneﬁts increases, it induces more early retirement. Preliminary analysis showed
the negative relationship between this variable and the labor force participation
and the employment rates of older workers.
The eﬀect of interest in our case is given by β10 which shows how a modiﬁcation
of retirement of older workers, changes the unemployment rate, all things being
equal. The results are presented in Table 2.
The vacancy rate has the expected eﬀects on the unemployment rate. An
increase in the vacancy rate reduces the unemployment rate as unemployed work-
ers ﬁnd a job more easily. Union density has a positive eﬀect on unemployment.
Indeed, there is some evidence in the literature that trade union power in wage
setting has a signiﬁcant impact on unemployment (Nickell and Layard, 1999). Eco-
nomic slowdown also increases unemployment. The eﬀects of the two considered
shocks are signiﬁcant. This result points to the importance of a cyclical unem-
ployment pattern, which can be explained by macroeconomic shocks. The level
of productivity displays a positive eﬀect on unemployment but the labor costs in
productivity units have no signiﬁcant eﬀect; that is, on average, wages increase
moderately compared to productivity.
The generosity of the social security system towards early retirement displays
a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on unemployment rates. This shows that the




log(vit) -0.411*** (-10.03) -0.446*** (-9.64)
bit -0.003 (-0.06) 0.008 (1.35)
udit 0.021*** (5.60) 0.022*** (5.09)
epit -0.388*** (-5.16) -0.445*** (-5.24)
rrit 0.019** (2.06) 0.021** (2.01)
TFPit -1.277** (-1.96) -0.872 (-1.19)
γit 0.056*** (9.87) 0.054*** (8.46)
lcit -0.011 (-3.65) -0.014 (-3.99)
pit 3.477** (2.01) 5.670*** (2.91)
erit 2.103*** (-3.55) 3.027*** (-4.54)
Fixed eﬀects YES YES
Time trend YES YES
Observations 216 216
Note: t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * stand for signiﬁcant at the
1%, 5% and 10 % level.
22higher probability of early retirement, which results in a decrease in the labor
force participation of older workers has a negative impact on the labor outcomes
of all workers. Unemployment increases with increased early retirement. The
results show that increased retirement, which translates as a reduction in the
participation rate of older workers, has a negative impact on the labor market.
Because it decreases the length of a match with older workers, increased retirement
incites ﬁrms to open up fewer vacancies. It therefore has a negative eﬀect on the
unemployment rate, which increases. Within this framework, we are not able
to identify positive or negative externalities but we observe the overall eﬀect of
an increase in retirement opportunities on labor market outcomes, which appears
overall to be negative.
We also estimate an age-speciﬁc unemployment equation. The last columns of
Table 2 shows the interaction with the younger age group. In this case we estimate
a ”partial” BC, which relates the youth unemployment rate to its determinants.
The results are of the same order of magnitude as for the total unemployment
rate. Increased retirement has a negative impact on youth unemployment.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between retirement and unem-
ployment by means of an equilibrium unemployment model with workers of dif-
ferent ages. In the theoretical framework, the productivity of older workers turns
out to be a key variable of the labor market. We have shown that in the presence
of greater retirement opportunities, young workers may beneﬁt from the high quit
rate of older workers if older workers demonstrate suﬃciently high productivity
compared to younger ones. This means that when older workers are induced to
quit the labor market early, older workers need to be very attractive for ﬁrms in
23order to incite ﬁrms to keep opening up vacancies.
We performed two kinds of estimation of the model’s prediction. First, we sim-
ulated the model in taking conventional parameter values that allow a replication
of actual OECD labor markets regularities. The results show that the younger
unemployment rate is rather badly aﬀected by retirement for the acceptable value
of productivity diﬀerential. Second, we performed a regression analysis of the Bev-
eridge curve, which is the unemployment rate. This was carried out using data
from a panel of OECD countries. The results highlight that the probability of
retirement of older workers has a negative impact on the whole population as well
as on the unemployment rates of the younger population.
These results are of great interest when one considers the unemployment-
reducing mechanism behind the setting of most early retirement programs. The
model’s predictions and the empirical estimations contradict the lump of labor ar-
gument, which assumes that early retirement will decrease unemployment. How-
ever, it is important to stress the partial feature of this analysis. In a general
equilibrium framework, we could expect some additional eﬀects to emerge from
the consumption behavior of individuals. Furthermore, it is also important to
question the means of ﬁnancing early retirement programs. Since these programs
are generally based on a pay-as-you-go system, early retirement will raise taxes
on labor and hence will raise the wage costs to the ﬁrm with the consequence of
depressing labor demand.
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276 Appendix
A. Summary of model’s variables
Table 3: Model’s variables
Variable Description
p Share of young population
ηy Probability of aging for young workers
ηo Probability of retirement for old workers
γ Young worker’s productivity
δγ Old worker’s productivity
 y Idiosyncratic shock toward young jobs
 o Idiosyncratic shock toward old jobs
b Return when unemployed
r Interest rate
k Cost of vacancies
π Ratio of uy/u
β Workers bargaining power
θ Market tightness
q(θ) Probability of ﬁlling a vacancy
28B. The job creation curve
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From 5), we know that:
Jo =
δγ − wo
r +   + ηo
(25)
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Nash bargaining requires that the wage is given by
Wi − Ui = β(Ji − Ui + Wi) (26)
Let us start with the young workers. From (4) and (7), we have:
Jy =
γ − wy + ηyJo
r +  y + ηy
and
Wy =
wy +  yUy + ηyWo
r +  y + ηy
By substituting in 26, we have:
wy = βγ + βηyJo − (1 − β)ηyWo + (1 − β)(r + ηy)Uy (27)
From 26, we have that Wy − Uy =
β
1−βJy and from (9), we obtain:
(r +  y)Uy = b + θq(θ)
β
1 − β
γ − wy + ηyJo
r +  y + ηy
+ ηyUo (28)
And in substituting in 27, we obtain:
wy =














and in an analogous way, for the older workers, we have:
wo =









30D. Derivation of δ∗
From the equilibrium equation of wy and wo, we can rewrite Jy and Jo as:
Jy =
(1 − β)(γ − b) + ηyJo
r +  y + ηy + βθq(θ)
Jo =
(1 − β)(δγ − b
r +  o + ηo + βθq(θ)
The value of δ∗ is simply obtained by equalizing Jy to Jo:
δ
∗ = 1 +
( o −  y + ηo)(1 − b
γ)
r +  y + βθq(θ)
31E. Supply of vacancies













− k = 0
And by simple arithmetics, we obtain:
v =
￿




We see that the supply of vacancies also depends on the composition of unem-
ployment. Even if at the moment they open a vacancy, employers do not know
whether they will meet a young or an old worker, they do know the aggregate
composition of unemployment, and therefore they can calculate the probability of
meeting each of the worker types.
32F. The relationship between θ and uo













kuy (pJo − (1 − p)Jy)
(k (puy + (1 − p)uo))
2
!
The ﬁrst and the second terms of the right-hand side are positive. The third
term is positive or negative according to the value taken by δ. The sign of the
derivative will be:
1. dθ
duo ≥ 0 if δ ≤ δ∗∗
2. δ∗∗ is such that Jo >
1−p
p Jy
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